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Operation Pendennis: A Case Study of an Australian Terrorist Plot
by Bart Schuurman, Shandon Harris-Hogan, Andrew Zammit and Pete Lentini 
Abstract
This Research Note article provides a case study of a major Australian terrorist investigation, code-named 
Operation Pendennis. Drawing primarily from publicly available court transcripts, this study seeks to expand 
upon the growing literature within terrorism studies which utilises primary source materials. Its aim is to 
provide a detailed overview of Operation Pendennis that might serve as a resource for other scholars. The work 
also aims to add to existing knowledge regarding how terrorists prepare their attacks and react when under 
surveillance. This is done by providing a descriptive account of two cells’ preparations for an act of terrorism, and 
their unsuccessful attempts to evade authorities.
Keywords: homegrown, jihadism, Australia
Introduction
Given the ongoing need for detailed and primary sources-based accounts of terrorist incidents, this Research 
Note provides a case study of Operation Pendennis.[1] Operation Pendennis was Australia’s longest running 
terrorism investigation, culminating in the arrest of two self-starting militant Islamist cells in late 2005. 
This account primarily uses information drawn from publicly available court transcripts of the associated 
prosecutions and interviews with two public prosecutors involved in the Pendennis case. Drawing from such 
sources allows for the creation of a more accurate account of events than those currently provided by news 
and media sources, which are often marred by errors or may uncritically accept claims made by either the 
prosecution or defence. Rather than detailing the radicalisation processes of the individuals involved, which 
are addressed elsewhere [2], this analysis specifically focuses on the participants’ activities to further their 
plot, and their attempts to evade state surveillance. The primary source material provides unique insights into 
how these terrorists acted both to maintain operational security and to advance their operation.
Islamist terrorism has been a small but persistent threat in Australia. Prior to Pendennis, Australia 
experienced an unsuccessful al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah-guided conspiracy to bomb Israeli and Jewish 
targets during the 2000 Sydney Olympics while a Lashkar e-Toiba (LeT) guided plot was foiled in Sydney 
in 2003. A Melbourne-based self-starting cell which had planned to attack Holsworthy Army Barracks was 
foiled in 2009. In addition, militant Islamists from Australia have participated in training or combat overseas, 
mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 1999 and 2003, Lebanon throughout the 2000s, Somalia from 
2007 onwards, and more recently in Yemen and Syria.[3] However, of the 23 people who have been convicted 
in Australia for Islamist-related terror offences, 18 were arrested in Operation Pendennis. Moreover, several 
subsequent terrorism-related investigations in Australia have involved the family, friends and associates of 
the Pendennis men[4]. Given the significance of this operation, Pendennis provides a useful case study into 
the broader phenomenon of Islamist terrorism in Australia.
A Brief Overview of Operation Pendennis
Operation Pendennis was a joint Victoria Police, New South Wales Police, Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) investigation which began in 2004. The operation 
resulted in a series of arrests between November 2005 and March 2006, which led to terrorism charges being 
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brought against thirteen suspects in Melbourne and nine in Sydney.
In Melbourne nine men were ultimately convicted on a range of terrorism offences, with two pleading guilty 
and seven found guilty at trial. These nine men had an average age of 26 at the time of their arrest, with 
the eldest member (Abdul Nacer Benbrika) aged 45 and the youngest member just 20.[5] Most of the cell 
was new to Islamist militancy, with the exception of one who had trained in al-Qaeda’s al-Faruq camp in 
Afghanistan in 2001, though he did not play a leading role in the cell’s activities.[6] Only two of the men had 
completed secondary education, while two others were known to have a previous criminal record. Seven of 
the men were of Lebanese origin, while Benbrika hailed from Algeria.[7] The other man (Shane Kent) was 
a Caucasian Australian who was also the only convert within the cell.[8] However, the group’s radicalisation 
was certainly a ‘home-grown’ phenomenon; seven of the nine were born in Australia, while another 
immigrated as a child. Seven were married at the time of their arrest whilst four also had children.[9] Indeed, 
it has been noted that this level of family commitment impacted the amount of time several members were 
able to dedicate to the cell.[10] Court documents describe Benbrika as very much the leader and religious 
authority of the cell, whose teachings centred upon the The Call to Global Islamic Resistance written by Abu 
Musab al-Suri.[11] Aimen Joud and Fadl Sayadi fulfilled important roles as his deputies.[12]
By 2010, all nine Sydney men were convicted, with four pleading guilty and five found guilty at trial. In 
contrast to the Melbourne cell, the Sydney group was far older and more experienced. The average age of the 
cell was 29 with only one member aged below 24 at the time of their arrest.[13] There are also indications 
that up to four members of the Sydney cell had previously trained in Lashker-e-Toiba camps in Pakistan 
between 1999 and 2001, though only one case was proven in court.[14] Like the Melbourne cell, only two 
men had completed secondary level education and two also held a previous criminal record. Once again like 
in the Melbourne cell, eight of the nine Sydney cell members were married and all but two had children. Five 
of the Sydney men also shared a Lebanese background, while the four others were of Bangladeshi, Bosnian, 
Jordanian and Anglo-Indonesian background.[15] Born in Lebanon and raised in Australia, Mohammed 
Elomar was described in court as the ‘puppet master’ of the Sydney cell. His leadership role was explicitly 
stated by the judge as the reason for sentencing Mohammed to the longest term of incarceration of any of the 
men from either cell.[16]
The 18 men convicted in total were members of two distinct terrorist cells which planned to carry out 
violence against the Australian government, motivated primarily by Australia’s participation in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. They were inspired by al-Qaeda and its narrative, with their leader citing ‘terrorist acts 
committed by mujahideen around the world, including the bombings in New York and Washington, Bali, 
Madrid, Jakarta, London and Iraq, as exemplars to be admired and emulated’.[17] The relatively high number 
of individuals from or with links to Lebanon is an interesting feature of the Operation Pendennis suspects 
and reflects a broader feature of militant Islamism in Australia.[18]
The Sydney cell was the more advanced of the two groups, having amassed firearms, ammunition, detonators, 
chemicals, laboratory equipment and bomb-making instruction manuals. When sentencing five members 
of the cell, the judge noted that ‘absent the intervention of the authorities, the plan might well have come 
to fruition in early 2006 or thereabouts. The materials were to hand and recipes for the construction of 
explosives were available’.[19]
By contrast, the Melbourne cell’s activities were less directly operational and largely supportive in nature. 
Their actions involved fund-raising (including through fraud and theft), acquiring bomb-making 
instructions and other extremist materials, attempting to acquire firearms, exploring the acquisition of 
explosives, undertaking training and bonding trips, and cooperating closely with the Sydney cell on a range 
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of activities.[20] Members of the Melbourne cell were convicted for knowingly forming a group ‘directly or 
indirectly engaged in preparing or fostering the doing of a terrorist act’[21], not for planning a specific attack 
themselves.
The Melbourne cell had been formed under the guidance of the aforementioned Benbrika, a ‘sheikh’ without 
any formal religious education.[22] The Sydney cell was formed independently of the Melbourne cell, but 
from at least August 2004 onwards the two groups were in regular communication. Benbrika frequently 
visited Sydney members, becoming the religious authority for both of the cells, and individuals from the 
Sydney cell also spent time in Victoria.[23] However, while the Melbourne cell was predominantly made up 
of newly-radicalised individuals drawn towards Benbrika, several of the Sydney men were associated –
sometimes directly and sometimes through friends and family – with terrorist activity in Lebanon or with 
earlier plots in Australia (including the 2000 Roche plot and the 2003 LeT plot).[24] This distinction would 
come to influence the progress of the plot and different practices of the two cells.
Practical Preparations
Up until the beginning of 2005 the Melbourne cell’s activities were largely confined to gathering propaganda 
and instructional material, and acquiring income for the group’s sandooq (literally ‘coffer’ or [war]‘chest’). 
Although all members of the cell were expected to make regular contributions towards the sandooq, the 
group mainly generated income through stealing cars and selling off the parts. The practical preparations for 
terrorist activities were predominantly undertaken by the Sydney cell.
The Sydney cell appeared to have had a basic understanding of the materials required to construct explosives, 
but faced difficulties acquiring precursors. While some of this was material was acquired relatively easily, 
including railway detonators and instructional material (they possessed step-by-step instructions for 
manufacturing TATP and HMTD), laboratory equipment and chemicals proved more difficult to procure.
[25] Throughout early 2005 members of both the Sydney and Melbourne cells, using false names, attempted 
to acquire laboratory equipment via a Victorian based supplier. However, fearing possible police surveillance, 
they did not collect the goods. Despite this setback, in July 2005 the Sydney cell did manage to obtain a small 
consignment of glassware.[26]
From June 2005 onwards, the Sydney cell also tried to purchase several of the chemicals required to build 
explosives. However, several merchants were suspicious of their intended purchases and either dissuaded 
them from attempting to make the purchases or informed authorities of customers whose interests in their 
wares alarmed them. Yet the group eventually obtained many litres of distilled water, acetone, hydrogen 
peroxide and hydrochloric acid.[27] In October, one of the suspects also tried to steal a large quantity of 
batteries and clocks (to be used as timers) but was foiled by store security.[28]
During 2005, members of the Sydney cell also purchased large quantities of 7.62mm ammunition, totalling 
nearly 20,000 rounds. Although the cell’s operational leader, Mohamed Ali Elomar was legally in possession 
of several firearms, only one (a bolt-action rifle) was capable of firing 7.62 mm ammunition. When 
sentencing Elomar, the judge noted that the ammunition ‘was to have been used in other automatic or 
semi-automatic weaponry’.[29] The group was never found to be in the possession of such weaponry, but 
prosecutors suspected that the Sydney suspects managed to hide one or more AK-47s before their arrest.[30] 
The group also attempted to construct improvised explosives, using gunpowder from rifle cartridges.
As previously noted, the Melbourne cell had only a limited operational role, and primarily concerned itself 
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with support activities. Though Benbrika’s immediate inner-circle hoped to use their sandooq to purchase 
materials, they abandoned this plan because of lack of funds. Indeed, the group largely proved amateurish 
and acquired little material of practical use beyond their vast collection of propaganda and bomb-making 
manuals.[31] One of the group’s members was arrested for credit card fraud, and on multiple occasions 
senior members of the cell lamented that many of the members did not demonstrate sufficient discipline and 
that this threatened the cell’s existence and prospects. A planned team-building weekend failed when they 
arrived at the location late, disturbed local residents, and had to cancel the event and return to Melbourne.
[32] When several Melbourne members attended a weekend organised by the Sydney group in March 
2005, the contrast in progress and professionalism was stark. Sydney members had organised weapons and 
ammunition for large-scale shooting practice, and the police later found evidence of possible experiments 
with explosives.
Indeed, following this exposure one member of the Melbourne cell suggested Benbrika move to Sydney 
to further the group’s progress.[33] However, Benbrika’s main focus remained on completing the religious 
‘education’ of the Melbourne men, imparting his understandings of jihad and martyrdom. Following a series 
of police raids in Sydney (in June and August) and in Melbourne (June) Benbrika came to believe that his 
arrest was imminent. This prompted him to speed up his dissemination of the ideas in al-Suri’s book and he 
began to advise the more trusted members of the group to be willing to act independently of him.[34]
No Clear Target
Despite media speculation on the subject, there remain no strong indications that the Melbourne cell had 
selected any specific targets. Although one of the suspects stated at trial that Benbrika was interested in 
attacking major sports events, no significant evidence was found to corroborate this. Moreover, the judge 
noted that this suspect had a track record of making false claims. During a police raid in November 2005 
police did recover the floor plans of several government buildings in Melbourne, but it remains likely that no 
specific target was ever selected.[35]
Similarly, there is no direct evidence that the Sydney cell had selected a specific target. However, there are 
indications that the group may have explored the possibility of attacking the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor. 
These suspicions derive from an investigation into the theft of a number of rocket launchers from the 
stockpiles of the Australian Army. During the separate trial of a man named Taha Abdul-Rahman (who was 
later convicted for his role in selling the stolen weapons) a police statement alleged that he sold five of the 
rocket launchers to Sydney cell leader Mohamed Ali Elomar. The statement claimed Elomar had stated an 
intention to “blow up the nuclear place”.[36] Moreover, three members of the Sydney cell were intercepted 
within the restricted area surrounding the facility.[37] However, at no stage during the Sydney trial did the 
prosecution contend a specific target had been chosen and the rocket launchers allegedly sold to Elomar have 
never been recovered.[38]
From the sources available, it can be concluded that the two cells did not progress beyond attempting to 
acquire the materials required for an act of terrorism to the selection of a specific target.
The Role of the Infiltrator ‘SIO39’
One early component of the Pendennis investigation involved the infiltration of Victoria Police Special 
Intelligence Officer 39 (SIO39) into the Melbourne cell.[39] Posing as a Turkish man named ‘Ahmet Sonmez’, 
SIO39 began attending Benbrika’s religious classes in May 2004.[40] By September 2004 he had gained 
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the confidence of the sheikh to such a degree that he was invited into his home. During this encounter 
SIO39 feigned regret concerning his ownership of Coca-Cola shares, and casually referred to his purported 
experience using explosives while working in the construction industry. Benbrika’s response was to explore 
SIO39’s views regarding jihad and inquire about the idea of using SIO39’s knowledge of explosives to ‘do 
something’ in Australia.[41]
In October of that year, Benbrika accompanied SIO39 to a nature reserve to the north of Melbourne where 
SIO39 detonated a small quantity of explosives in a demonstration to Benbrika. Benbrika then asked SIO39 
what quantity would be necessary to destroy a building, and the pair discussed the practical and financial 
aspects of obtaining the materials to make bombs of this kind.[42]
However the undercover officer’s role ended shortly afterward. By late 2004, several core members began 
expressing suspicions regarding SIO39, with Benbrika coming to share their view. This led Benbrika to make 
a number of statements to wrong-foot the Australian authorities and SIO39, announcing that he had changed 
his mind and that jihad in Australia was not permissible after all.[43] However, when sentencing Benbrika 
the judge noted that, ‘if Benbrika was cautious in his dealings with SIO39, this was in complete contrast to his 
open encouragement of the members of the group to engage in terrorism’.[44]
Concealment Activities
The Melbourne cell’s suspicions that they were under police surveillance somewhat stifled their planned 
activities. Fundraising slowed significantly following a series of police raids which uncovered stolen cars, 
propaganda, bomb-making manuals and several thousand Australian dollars.[45] Over time cell members 
also began to suspect that their phones were being tapped, and constantly discussed their concern that they 
might be arrested for what they were planning. There was also great concern among the group regarding 
potential informants within the local Muslim community, although Benbrika repeatedly refused requests to 
subject suspected informants to ill-treatment.[46]
Despite the group’s compromised position, the Melbourne cell did continue their activities and preparations 
(albeit in a more limited fashion). One member even tried to purchase firearms on the black market. This 
continuation may have been related to the fatalistic views of Benbrika, who preached that the group’s actions 
would either manifest in a successful attack or continue from prison. Notably, Benbrika did exercise patience 
in his movements towards this goal, pushing back against group members who were constantly pestering him 
about when the cell was finally going to do ‘something’. Some threatened to split from the group in order to 
speed up activities. At the end of October 2005 Benbrika appeared to want to pause the group’s activities in 
order to lessen the attention placed on them by authorities, but this proved impossible due to the impatience 
of group members.[47]
The Melbourne cell also made some limited efforts to implement operational security measures. However, 
their execution of these was amateurish at best.[48] While they often used code words because they feared 
their phones were tapped, on one occasion one member openly exchanged an SMS message with an arms 
dealer about a prospective weapons purchase, possibly unaware that SMS messages could be intercepted. The 
group’s system of code words for communicating via telephone was also compromised on several occasions 
when members of the cell either did not understand the words, or forgot to use them. Despite being aware 
that the group was under surveillance, Benbrika even agreed to be interviewed on national television, later 
declaring triumphantly that he had fooled the interviewer.[49]
In contrast, the Sydney cell’s counter-surveillance efforts were implemented with more professionalism. They 
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used a range of disposable mobile telephones registered under false names, ordered goods under fictitious 
names, and whispered whenever discussing anything particularly incriminating.[50] The group also often 
switched the cars used to pick up equipment, and registered the vehicles under other people’s names.[51] It 
was the implementation of counter-surveillance measures, coupled with an imminent fear of potential arrest 
that created difficulties for the group when attempting to obtain laboratory equipment and chemicals.[52] 
However, these countermeasures did not prevent police searches conducted in June and August of 2005 from 
uncovering firearms, large quantities of ammunition, extremist literature and bomb-making manuals.
Arrests
Fearing imminent arrest, in October 2005 the Sydney cell commenced attempts to erase any tracks of 
what they had been planning. To this end members purchased hollow PVC tubes for the storage of goods 
underground. The suspicion that the cell buried a range of incriminating materials and weaponry is 
somewhat reinforced by the fact that one member made enquiries with a large number of estate agents 
regarding remote pieces of land in October. Two other men also rented powerful metal detectors, possibly 
used to test whether they would be able to retrieve the concealed items. Prosecutors also believed that the 
Sydney group possessed a remote ‘safe house’.[53] The cell members’ fears of arrest proved well-founded, as 
the plotters were arrested in a series of raids on 8 November 2005. During one arrest, there was an exchange 
of gunfire between the police and the suspect which resulted in both the suspect and a police officer suffering 
gunshot wounds.[54]
Conclusion
This Research Note provided a brief case study of a major terrorist plot within Australia. Drawing primarily 
from publicly available court transcripts, the case study sought to expand the growing literature within 
terrorism studies that is based on primary source material and act as a resource for other scholars. The case 
study also sought to add to knowledge of how terrorists prepare for prospective attacks and react when under 
surveillance, by providing a descriptive account of the two cells, their preparations and their unsuccessful 
attempts to evade authorities. It showed how the two cells operated under the guidance of a single spiritual 
leader who influenced members towards preparing for an attack targeting the Australian government. Their 
preparations and security precautions were unsuccessful and often amateurish, particularly in the case of the 
Melbourne cell. While the Sydney cell progressed much further in their practical efforts, neither cell reached 
a point where an attack could be considered imminent, due to their incompetence as well as a result of 
effective pre-emptive actions by authorities.
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